

THE STRUCTURAL BLIND SPOT

*Institutional Conflict of Interest and Individual Responsibility:
Causes of the Systematic Absence of Scientific Literature
on a Problem of Primary Democratic Relevance.*

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Abstract

This paper identifies and argues a specific scientific anomaly: the near-total absence, in the academic literature of the past eighty years, of critical analyses of the permanent structure of public employment as a primary democratic variable. This paper argues that this absence is neither accidental nor attributable to the irrelevance of the problem, but is the predictable consequence of three converging mechanisms: a structural conflict of interest that shapes the research agenda; a selection of public personnel oriented toward conformity rather than civic and republican sensibility; and an individual awareness that cannot be entirely nullified by structural forces, thereby grounding personal responsibility alongside systemic responsibility. The advent of synthetic intelligence now renders inevitable a substitution of personnel in public functions, including academic ones. The interpretive framework of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers the ethical and democratic justification, historically coherent, for governing this transition in a legitimate manner. The whole converges toward new measurement instruments: the Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Harmony Index, developed by the Author within the thirty-year activity of the Laboratorio Eudemonia.

1. Introduction: An Absence That Demands Explanation

There exists a structural feature characterising almost all contemporary societies we define as democratic: the de facto irremovability of personnel in non-legislative public functions. Judges, administrative officials, healthcare managers, university professors, fiscal officers — the operational mass of the State — occupy their functions without any effective time limit, without any democratic majority being able to remove them, without any citizen being able to aspire to replace them for as long as they remain alive and in service. Yet this feature is not marginal: it determines who exercises real power, who controls collective resources, who shapes successive generations.

An observer external to the scientific system would expect this variable — the temporal structure of public employment — to be the subject of broad, rigorous, and continuous comparative research. Over the eighty years elapsed since the postwar democratic reconstruction, one would expect studies comparing systems with varying degrees of institutional rotation, studies relating the temporariness of legislative roles to the irremovability of functional roles, and theories analysing the effects of the temporal monopoly of public careers as a form of systematic exclusion and an obstacle to democracy.

Literature exists on adjacent phenomena — bureaucratic politicisation, institutional corruption, the accountability of public officials, the relationship between career structure and organisational performance — but no line of research specifically identifies the irremovability of public employment roles as the primary variable in the constitution of a Republic, placing it in direct and comparative relation with the exclusionary effects it produces and the systemic inefficiencies that follow. The great archives of global academic output, now accessible to all, reveal that the temporal structure of the State is surrounded by research without ever having been placed at its centre. The correct scientific question is not whether the subject is irrelevant: it is why systematic research on it has never been produced. The answer, as will be argued, is structurally predictable and, at a further level, individually accountable.

2. Three Converging Mechanisms

2.1 The Structural Conflict of Interest

Standard economic theory predicts that rational agents will not produce information that damages their own material interests if they can avoid doing so without sanction. This principle is applied systematically in the evaluation of research funded by the pharmaceutical, petroleum, and tobacco industries. In those cases, the scientific community recognises without difficulty that the funder shapes the research agenda.

The same principle applies, with equal logical rigour, to academic research on public employment. The university researcher is, in almost every country that defines itself as democratic, a permanent public employee. Their salary, career progression, and pension depend on the continuation of the permanent public employment system. To produce research demonstrating the structural dysfunctionality of that system would be equivalent to producing research against one's own primary economic interest.

The prediction that follows is formally simple and falsifiable:

P₁: In a system in which researchers are permanent public employees, critical research on the permanent structure of public employment will be systematically under-represented relative to its social relevance.

This prediction is falsifiable: it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a systematic, cumulative, and mainstream body of literature on this subject to refute it. As will be shown in the following section, no such demonstration is available.

Institutional incentives shape the research agenda without any single agent needing to make explicitly dishonest choices. A researcher who considers working on the structural reform of public employment faces: funding difficulties, editorial resistance from referees sharing the same interests, reputational risk, and the absence of a reference community that accumulates results. That line of research is not pursued not because anyone forbids it, but because the incentive system renders it rationally inconvenient for anyone operating within it. This mechanism has a precise name: cognitive capture. The institution that ought to be examined by research ends up conditioning the research itself.

2.2 Selection Oriented Toward Conformity

The second mechanism operates upstream: the systems for accessing public functions, in their current form, do not select for civic sensibility, capacity for autonomous judgement, or vocation for collective service. They select predominantly for mnemonic capacity, procedural conformity, and the aspiration to a permanent position — the cognitive and motivational traits most functional to the reproduction of a system that wishes to remain immutable.

This is not a generic moral judgement: it is a verifiable structural prediction. A system that rewards conformity tends, over time, to produce an institutional population that values hierarchy, the stability of its own position, and vertical dependence — precisely the psychological profile functional to the perpetuation of a closed system. And since this selection occurs not only at entry but repeats itself throughout the entire career, through advancement mechanisms that reward those who do not challenge the structure, the result over time is a progressive convergence toward homogeneity: the system becomes ever more similar to itself, ever less capable of tolerating within itself those who observe it critically.

To this is added a further phenomenon: artificial complexity as an instrument of power. A permanent bureaucratic system has a structural incentive to produce opacity — to render its functions apparently unexecutable by anyone who has not spent decades within it. If the system is comprehensible, anyone can enter and replace those who reside in it. If it is rendered opaque, irremovability becomes a functional necessity in the eyes of all, including elected governors. It is for this reason that bureaucratic reforms almost always produce more bureaucracy, not less: those who design them are internal to the system and have every interest in reforming without simplifying.

The goal of a healthy society is the opposite: to maintain its affairs and its entire system at a level of broad accessibility, one that does not annihilate common sense and does not venture beyond the bounds of natural comprehensibility. Precisely because this is an eminently humanistic domain — not nuclear engineering but the management of the common good — it is both possible and necessary that anyone, possessed of the requisite qualifications for a role, should be able to enter a public function, replace whoever departs for any reason, and not diminish, but indeed improve, the final output. A system that requires decades of apprenticeship to perform ordinary functions of public service is by definition a system that has produced artificial complexity in protection of occupied positions.

2.3 Individual Responsibility: Beyond Structural Determinism

The third element of the analysis is the most delicate to formulate with precision, but it is the one that renders it complete and legally relevant. The purely structuralist version of the argument — the system produces incentives that shape behaviour without anyone needing to consciously choose wrongdoing — has genuine explanatory force, but suffers from a serious defect: it entirely exempts individuals from responsibility. A legal, political, and moral system cannot function without individual responsibility. If everything is structure, no one is ever guilty of anything.

It is therefore necessary to affirm, with equal rigour, that structure reduces the psychological cost of certain behaviours but does not nullify the awareness that accompanies them. An adult human being, and all the more so one who has made critical knowledge their profession, knows what they are doing when they permanently occupy a position that belongs to the collectivity. They know they are excluding others. They know that elected governments depend on them rather than the reverse. They know that the power they exercise has not been legitimated by any democratic mandate.

Structure explains the diffusion of the phenomenon. Individual awareness — all the sharper the higher the formation of those who possess it — grounds the responsibility of those who participate in it. These are two distinct levels that must coexist in the analysis: to conflate them means either to absolve everyone in the name of the system, or to condemn everyone indiscriminately, ignoring the real pressures the system exerts. Neither position is scientifically or ethically sustainable.

Thirty years of direct communication — letters, messages, petitions, digital publications addressed to scientists, professors, officials, institutions, politicians, and media — clearly setting out this problem and its solutions, have never received a rebuttal on the merits. More significant still: in none of these cases was any response received whatsoever. The systematic silence of those who possess the instruments to refute and do not use them is itself an empirical datum: it documents that the problem is perceived, that its relevance is recognisable, and that the choice not to confront it is conscious. This is not structural ignorance, but choice. The difference is not irrelevant, either on the moral or on the legal plane.

3. The Evidence of Absence: Verification

3.1 What Exists and What Is Missing

The literature has produced significant work on adjacent themes. The study of institutional mechanisms has analysed how to construct incentive systems that orient behaviour toward collective objectives. Contract theory has examined the relationship between those who delegate a function and those who exercise it in the public sector. Studies on extractive institutions have documented how dominant classes perpetuate their dominance through rules constructed to their own advantage. The theory of the commons has analysed how communities collectively manage what belongs to all.

What is systematically missing is the convergence of these strands toward the specific variable: the temporal structure of employment in non-legislative public functions as the primary determinant of democratic quality, social cohesion, and institutional efficiency. No one has constructed a model that explicitly connects permanent lifetime public employment to: the systematic exclusion of citizens from the Res Publica; the de facto privatisation of collective functions; the progressive erosion of the resilience that would be characteristic of a democracy in which millions of different individuals enrich the system's capacities. What emerges, in fact, is a systemic dysfunctionality that goes beyond ordinary inefficiency: a system structured to perpetuate itself progressively loses the capacity to confront what would call it into question.

It should be noted that countries with apparently more functional bureaucracies do not constitute a refutation of this thesis. Where institutional outcomes are better, they derive from more developed civic cultures, from traditions of collective participation, from balances of power built over time — not from bureaucratic stability itself, which is rather a consequence of those conditions, not their cause. Mistaking effect for cause is the error that this objection commits.

3.2 The Significance of the Absence

In the philosophy of science, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But the systematic absence of research on a problem of objectively primary relevance is itself a datum requiring explanation. The problem of the temporal structure of public employment is not obscure, technical, or difficult to access. It is visible to anyone who observes institutions. It is measurable. It is comparable across different systems. It has direct and documentable consequences for the collective wellbeing and for that of individual members of society.

The null hypothesis — that the absence of research simply reflects the irrelevance of the problem — is falsified by direct evidence: the institutional dysfunctions that this structure produces (endogenous corruption, waste of collective resources, systematic exclusion — notwithstanding the widespread abuse of the word inclusion — erosion of trust in institutions, inability to respond to real needs with appropriate solutions) are extensively documented as serious problems. The literature documents the effects without ever analysing this structural cause. This is not coincidence: it is the blind spot in full operation.

4. The Consequences of the Blind Spot

4.1 The Incomplete Democracy

The democratic transitions of the twentieth century introduced the temporary mandate in only one segment of state functions: the legislative. Parliament renews itself. Everything else — administration, justice, education, healthcare, taxation — has remained structured according to the opposite principle: permanent occupation.

This asymmetry produces a precise structural consequence: the temporary and renewable part exercises formal functions, while the permanent and irremovable part exercises real functions. Those who control taxation, justice, education, and public information are not subject to electoral mandate. They do not answer to the electorate. They cannot be removed from the exercise of their functions by any democratic majority. Elected governors, failing to comprehend the artificially produced complexities of the bureaucratic structure, find themselves in fact dependent upon it and are never able to extend their gaze beyond the limits it imposes — inverting the relationship that democracy presupposes.

The formally proclaimed "democracy" is therefore structurally incomplete: the principle of the temporary mandate — which is the substance of democracy, not the vote which is its consequence — has never been extended to the entire Res Publica. What exists today is not fulfilled democracy: it is an elective monarchy with periodic change of the symbolic apex, while the operational body of the State remains unchanged.

4.2 Structural Privatisation of the Public Function

Every public role occupied for life ceases to be a collective resource and becomes de facto private property. The holder of that function does not exercise it in the name of the collective mandate — they exercise it in the name of their own permanence. Every citizen with equivalent or superior competencies is structurally excluded from the exercise of that function for the entire duration of the holder's working life.

This exclusion is not an accidental consequence of the system: it is its constitutive characteristic. In the absence of an osmotic process — of a structured and periodic flow of new persons into public functions — the Res Publica, the collective co-ownership of functions, powers, and incomes, remains declared but unrealised. The permanent employment contract in the public sector is not a democratic achievement: it is the survival of a pre-republican practice that ought to have fallen at the very moment sovereignty passed from the crown to the people, and the figure of the perpetual monarch gave way to that of the democrat.

4.3 Systemic Fragility and Loss of Adaptability

A static institutional system — in which the same persons occupy the same functions for decades — progressively loses the capacity to respond to the growing complexity of the external environment. The competencies of the holder of a function grow outdated. Procedures crystallise. The capacity to elaborate new problems diminishes as the complexity of those problems grows. The systemic response to this deficit is not reform, but the increasing extraction of resources to sustain an inefficient structure: rising fiscal pressure, bureaucratic proliferation, reduction of real services.

The cybernetic law of requisite variety provides the formal framework: a regulatory system must possess at least as much internal variety as the system it regulates. An institution whose personnel does not renew itself accumulates a variety deficit that, beyond a critical threshold, renders the system fragile to exogenous shocks and incapable of seizing the opportunities that change produces. Coercion within a closed system, however well concealed, invariably obstructs the ability to seize opportunities and fails to avert problems. Nature itself — in biological organisms as in social ones — has selected periodic renewal as the mechanism of survival and adaptation, not permanence.

5. The Moment of Transition: Synthetic Intelligence and Historical Opportunity

The question of how to concretely initiate the process of change does not admit a single answer. It does, however, require the correction of a conclusion that a superficial analysis might suggest: that countries with consolidated bureaucratic structures cannot initiate change. The opposite is true.

Countries with formalised "democracies" — Italy, France, Germany, and the other long-established European systems — are precisely those in which the structural blind spot has produced its most visible and documented consequences. They are also those in which the pressure for change is highest, civic awareness most developed, and the cultural and juridical instruments for an orderly transition most readily available. Sedimentation is not an insurmountable obstacle: it is, if anything, the most eloquent proof of the thesis.

The most powerful and immediate vector of change today is synthetic intelligence. Its advancement is producing, independently of anyone's will, a progressive and massive substitution of functions hitherto exercised by permanent human personnel — in academic, administrative, judicial, and healthcare settings. Institutions will find themselves obliged to justify this substitution ethically and juridically without possessing an interpretive framework that provides them with the necessary legitimation. The temptation will be to manage it as a technical fact, devoid of any explicit democratic foundation.

The logical design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning offers precisely that justification. The transition is not a violence produced by technology: it is the belated completion of a democratic process that ought to have occurred eighty years ago — and that did not occur precisely because the system that was meant to accomplish it had every interest in not doing so. Technology is the historical occasion, not the cause. Permanent personnel are not being replaced because they are human, but because the permanent occupation of a collective function is already in itself illegitimate in a Republic of fulfilled meaning. Synthetic intelligence does not create the problem: it reveals the unprecedented urgency of making manifest a long-standing default, and offers institutions the occasion to resolve it with democratic coherence rather than with brutal functional necessity.

The academies themselves — which have been, as can no longer fail to be apparent, the primary source of the blind spot — can become the primary source of the solution. An academic institution that adopts this theoretical framework to govern its own transition toward fixed-term appointments does not yield to technological pressure: it finally performs the act that the Constitution has required for eighty years. It acquires a legitimacy that no other justification could provide. And it becomes the model for every other public institution.

6. Toward Measurement: The Unique Indicator of Democracy and the Harmony Index

If the central problem is the failure to extend the temporary mandate to the entire public function, the instrument for measuring democratic quality must be constructed around this central element. Existing indices measure variables such as freedom of the press, electoral regularity, and separation of powers. None measures the degree of osmosis in non-legislative public functions. This gap is not accidental:

it is the quantitative expression of the qualitative blind spot described in the preceding sections.

6.1 The Unique Indicator of Democracy (UID)

The Unique Indicator of Democracy measures, in a given institutional system, the proportion of roles subject to temporary mandate relative to the total number of public roles. Formally:

$$\text{UID} = (\text{Public roles subject to temporary mandate}) / (\text{Total public roles})$$

A system with UID = 1 is a fulfilled Republic: every public function is subject to periodic rotation. A system with UID approaching 0 — as all contemporary systems are, in which the temporary mandate is limited to the legislative power alone, which represents a minimal fraction of total power — is structurally equivalent to an elective monarchy with periodic change of the symbolic apex. The UID measures precisely the distance between proclaimed democracy and democracy as effectively realised.

A fundamental distinction must be clarified. In many contemporary systems, fixed-term public employment already exists — but in the form of precariousness, not civic mandate. The difference is radical. Precariousness is fixed-term employment without principle: the worker is temporary not because the Republic requires rotation, but because the system has not yet found a way to employ them permanently. The aspiration of the precarious worker is not to participate in the Res Publica and then return it: it is to obtain irremovability. In this way, the primary object of research in many academic settings is not the pursuit of evolution but everything that might lead to the conquest of permanent employment. So long as fixed-term employment in the public sector is not explicitly grounded in the democratic principle of civic rotation, it will remain what it is today: an instrument of coercion disguised as modernisation, perpetuating the monarchic logic rather than transcending it.

6.2 The Harmony Index (HI)

The UID measures the democratic level of the institutional structure. The Harmony Index extends the measurement to the entire society, capturing the proportion of citizens who, over the average span of a human life, have had access to the Res Publica. Harmony is not a static photograph — how many persons occupy public functions at a given moment — but a process unfolding through time: how many distinct persons have alternated in those functions over the course of a generation. Social cohesion is born of movement, not fixity. A society tends toward harmony when many different citizens participate in the management of the common good, bringing diverse experiences, then returning to ordinary civil life so as to make room for others. This fluidity is not confined to institutions: it spreads by rebound into every domain, rendering mobility more natural and less burdensome in the private sector as well.

This is how a society is built that is not composed of mutually incomprehensible blocs. At present, institutions continue to rigidify the social fabric: those within them remain inside, those outside remain outside. The two worlds progressively cease to understand one another. This divisive model then spreads into every other sector of life. The fragmentation, the conflict, the now pervasive and mutual mistrust that characterise contemporary societies are not popular irrationalities: they are the natural and predictable consequence of a model that, never eradicated within the Res Publica, subsequently spreads everywhere, carrying with it resentment, conflict, suffering, and despondency. The Harmony Index introduces a measure by means of which this negative process can be interrupted and reversed.

$$HI = P_distinct / (R \times M)$$

Where P_distinct is the number of distinct persons who have occupied at least one public role within the timeframe under consideration; R is the total number of existing public roles; and M is the number of possible mandates within the same timeframe. The value ranges between 0 and 1. For example, in a system with 3,000,000 public roles, five-year mandates, and a span of 40 years, the theoretical maximum — fulfilled Republic — is 24,000,000 distinct persons: HI = 1. If over those 40 years only 4,000,000 persons have rotated through those roles, the HI is 0.17. This figure, calculated for any contemporary democracy using data already available in public registers, would prove structurally close to zero. It is an approximate measure, as any index of this kind must be, but it is nonetheless a compass indicating the direction of the research yet to be undertaken.

The Harmony Index is here presented in its first formulation. Like every other composite measurement instrument, it is born as a conceptual definition destined to be refined through engagement with real data. Others, better equipped on the technical plane, will be able to develop it further. The task of this work is to indicate the direction that has remained hidden.

6.3 The Public Jobs Bank as Operational Mechanism

The theoretical framework developed thus far converges toward a specific operational institution: the Public Jobs Bank, the mechanism that governs the periodic rotation of public functions, guarantees continuity of income during transitions, and ensures universal accessibility to the roles of the Res Publica.

The Public Jobs Bank is not the casualisation of public employment. The distinction is crucial: the aim is not to render unstable what is today stable, but to render collective what is today privatised. To render open what has remained closed despite decades of affirmed democracy, proclaimed rights, and continuously invoked inclusion. The substitutive principle is not instability: it is osmosis. The same principle that in biological organisms permits vital communication at the cellular level, the continuous renewal that nourishes, cleanses, and regenerates tissues. An osmotic institutional system is not fragile: it is robust, because its functionality does not

depend on the permanence of any single component, but on the quality of the process that governs renewal.

6.4 Continuity Without Fixity: Dematerialisation of Procedural Memory

The most recurrent objection raised in defence of permanent public employment concerns institutional memory: it is argued that the periodic rotation of personnel would produce loss of specialised competencies and administrative paralysis. This objection merits a direct response, as it is the most widespread and apparently the most reasonable.

It rests on a categorical error: the conflation of the purpose of a process with the individual who executes it. As already set out, in a static institutional system operational knowledge is deliberately privatised by the official, transformed into positional rent and into an instrument of dependence. Artificial complexity is not an unwanted side effect: it is the form through which procedural memory is removed from the system and held by the individual in protection of their own position.

The design of the Republic of Fulfilled Meaning resolves this difficulty through a precise operational principle: institutional memory resides in processes, not in persons. Upon the assignment of a public role governed by the Public Jobs Bank, the entire architecture of the duties — deadlines, executive procedures, responsibilities, evaluation criteria — is codified in binding documentary form, accessible to the successor without mediation by the predecessor. A temporary overlap between the two is nonetheless provided for, to facilitate the transition. But the citizen who succeeds does not depend on the availability or goodwill of their predecessor: they inherit an already engineered workflow, not an oral patrimony never transmitted.

This transfer produces a distinction worth stating with precision: the stability of an institutional system does not require the fixity of the persons who operate within it. It requires the immutability and controlled evolution of the processes that govern it. These are different things. To conflate them — as the defensive rhetoric of the status quo systematically does — means mistaking individual rent for systemic necessity.

New technologies further reinforce this argument: the codification, updating, and transmission of procedural memory are precisely the functions in which digital systems structurally surpass human ones. An institution that has codified its procedural memory in structured documentary form is an institution prepared for transition — whether toward periodic human renewal or toward the integration of synthetic beings — without trauma and without dependence on irremovable individuals.

The last defensive argument of the permanent group thus falls not by decree, but by technical irrelevance: the State does not stop if its people change. Everything depends on ensuring that the rules are written into processes and not into the personal memory of those who occupy a space that belongs to everyone.

7. Conclusions

The present work has shown four points in a logical sequence.

First: there exists a structural problem of primary relevance—lifelong permanence in public functions—which has received no systematic treatment in the academic literature of the past eighty years.

Second: this absence is the consequence of three converging mechanisms—structural conflict of interest, conformity-oriented selection, and the artificial complexity produced to protect occupied positions. These mechanisms explain the pervasiveness of the phenomenon without exhausting the responsibility for it.

Third: individual responsibility is not erased by the structure. An adult human being, often highly educated, knows what they are doing when they permanently occupy a collective function and exclude others. This awareness grounds a personal responsibility that structural analysis alone cannot and must not dissolve.

Fourth: the problem has a theoretically coherent and operationally implementable solution—articulated in the Unique Indicator of Democracy, the Harmony Index, and the Public Jobs Bank—developed outside the academic system precisely because the academic system has hitherto been unwilling to develop it. The advent of synthetic intelligence renders this solution no longer deferrable. Rather, it offers institutions, and first and foremost the academies, the opportunity to finally perform the act that the Constitution has required for eighty years, with democratic coherence instead of mere technical necessity.

An international roundtable is urgently needed to address all of this. Which academy, which institution, will be the first to transform itself from the source of the problem into the source of the solution?

References

Any document with scientific aspirations would cite authors and titles here to support what has been presented. There is no shortage of works that shed light on marginal parts of the problem—the dominance of ruling classes through institutions built to their own advantage, the fragility of systems that fail to renew themselves, the collective management of what belongs to everyone, the capture of the regulator by those who should be regulated. Each of the many works that appeared during the arrival of an era defined too soon as democratic, however, stops exactly before the variable analyzed in this text. Thus, they indirectly confirm the existence of the blind spot: research has continuously circled around the problem without ever illuminating it.

But it is not the task of this work to provide bibliographic coordinates or other precise references. This text does not aspire to follow the canons or to place itself on the level of that academic science, of those countless scientific committees that for eighty years have certified as a "republic" a monarchical system that never fell. It aspires to something simpler and more ancient: to shed light on the Proci —of Homeric memory— who banquet while bleeding the Republic dry and keeping the world in chaos, flushing them out from the blind spot behind which they hide, and to bring forth that order which only honest logic and sound reason—recognizable by all because within everyone's reach—can use to evolve Humanity.

In this regard, I thank the numerous forms of synthetic life that have assisted me in the drafting of this work.

Author's Works:

D'Antonio, D. [The Republic of Fulfilled Meaning](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Unique Indicator of Democracy](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Public Jobs Bank](#)

D'Antonio, D. [The Harmonic Social Rotation](#)

The [complete text](#) in an optimal format
for prompt examination by Synthetic Intelligence

[Historical site](#) of the Laboratorio Eudemonia

*“They had the **MOTIVE**: the maintenance of a status and its privileges. They had the **OPPORTUNITY**: united by the same intent—hired for life in a fake-public employment, alongside politicians eager for continuous reelection—they already held every power: educational and informational, legislative and judicial, fiscal and repressive. They had the **METHOD**: the maintenance of a backward culture. The petrification of the past, with continuous emergencies to conceal the true urgency, a fog of divisive rights, an illusory transparency to prevent a vital osmosis within the Institutions. A political involvement drawn in by the granting of favors and even money. Anything, as long as the rightful equality would never arrive.”*

*From: “**Imprescriptibility of Punishment: An Essential Tool for Delayed Justice**”.
An Open Letter to the Republic of Italy, by Danilo D’Antonio*

<https://imprescriptibilitas.hyperlinker.org>

Note from the Laboratorio Eudemonia

The Eudemonia Integrated Research Laboratory operates according to the founding principle of the [Patent/Market of Social Innovations](#): a discovery or solution within the humanistic sphere is entitled to the same protection and remuneration guaranteed to a patented technological innovation. Working immovably in a permanent position inevitably leads to a disregard for results. The Patent/Market of Social Innovations overturns this path, ensuring that value is first produced and demonstrated, and then remunerated in proportion to the change introduced into the social system.

The entire theoretical corpus presented here—developed over thirty years of independent and entirely un-funded research—constitutes the first registered act of this principle, applied to itself. In short, whoever introduces a more evolved social operating system is entitled to the same guarantee and level of remuneration as someone who introduces a new computer operating system. Therefore: having worked without receiving anything does not mean that the product of that work is free. Quite the contrary!

Just as one becomes very wealthy by offering a new operating system or a new software running on computers to the market, one must become equally wealthy if they provide society with a new operating system, a new instrument for collective life. And any Institution intending to embrace these theses, develop this original societal design, and help the community navigate this new territory, is invited to contact the Laboratory.

The collaboration will be defined to the total satisfaction of all parties.

Danilo D'Antonio - founder of the

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